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Converse § 1983 Suits in Which States
Police Federal Agents
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS ARRIVED
Vikram David Amar'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RANGE OF LOCAL OPPOSITION TO
FEDERAL ACTIONS
A key question for the country today is: What role, if
any, can state and local governments play in shaping the way
America prosecutes its war on terror and its wars against those
countries - like Iraq - that are alleged to be breeding grounds
for terrorists? This fundamental question lies at the core of a
movement that has swept across America in recent months.
State and local governmental opposition to the federal
government's decisions in the war on international terror has
taken many forms. Often, state and local entities simply
disagree with the policy advisability of the international course
pursued by the federal government, and want to register their
dissent. For example, last spring, the Los Angeles City Council
voted to "oppose unilateral war in Iraq." Although Los Angeles
was the biggest city to take such a stance, it was far from
alone. Close to one hundred other American cities and towns,
including San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia,
had already passed similar resolutions condemning any U.S.
(© 2004 Vikram David Amar. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of Law, San Francisco; Visiting
Professor of Law, UC Berkeley. This Article is part of the David G. Trager Public
Symposium, Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War
on Terror.
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invasion unsupported by the United Nations and most large
allies. '
In other instances, local governments have questioned
the wisdom of domestic legislative enactments and executive
rules. For example, a huge number of local governments have
denounced the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act - the law Congress passed
in the wake of 9-11 to enhance anti-terrorism law enforcement.
Towns like Oakland, Berkeley, and Boulder, Colorado, in
addition to the larger cities of San Francisco and Detroit, have
approved such measures.! Most of these resolutions harshly
criticize the policies of Congress and the Bush Administration.'
But local entities seem concerned with more than just
whether federal decisions are wise and effective; many cities
and states have registered concerns that federal decisions have
violated or will inevitably violate the constitutionally-
guaranteed liberties of Americans and those non-Americans
who may be affected by the exercise of American power." It is
for this reason that many local proposals go so far as to call
upon local agencies to decline to provide any aid to federal
authorities in investigations and enforcement actions that
might jeopardize civil liberties.' All of these measures have had
to overcome, among other things, the deep-seated notion that
state and local lawmakers have no business meddling in
national and international affairs. On this view, locals should
stick to the truly day-to-day narrow issues on which they
campaigned and were put in office.
On the surface, at least, this intuition - that state and
local government should stick to state and regional affairs -
appears to have its roots in our Constitution itself. As
commentators have observed, "it may [at first] seem
incongruous that states [and their subdivisions] would enjoy
any role in foreign affairs. The Constitution, after all, was
designed to ensure that the federal government had sufficient
See Vikram David Amar, Is It Appropriate, Under the Constitution, for State and
Local Governments to Weigh in on the War on Terror and a Possible War with Iraq?, FIND LAW'S
WRIT, Mar. 7, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20030307.html.
' See id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
' Id. Perhaps the best-known illustration of a local community's reluctance,
at least until its concerns were addressed, to assist the federal government involved
the city of Detroit, Michigan. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, A Nation Challenged: The
Interviews; A Police Force rebuffs F.B.L on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2001, at B7; Jodi Wilgoren, University of Michigan Won't Cooperate in Federal
Canvass, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at B6.
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authority to check state foreign relations activities."' That is
why many people welcome Supreme Court rulings that "help
put an end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy."7
It is true that federal law - both the Constitution itself
and laws Congress enacts under it - does impose some limits
on what states can do in the international realm, even as
globalization has drawn the local and international spheres
much closer together. But, federal law does not, and cannot, cut
state and local government out of the picture altogether. States
certainly have the power - and perhaps the duty - to speak out
on international matters, and to regulate their own citizenries
in ways the federal government may disfavor, so long as state
regulation is not preempted by valid federal laws. The
Constitution itself sometimes shields state authority from
federal interference. And, as we shall see, state governments
may use the Constitution as more than a shield for themselves;
they may use it to affirmatively shield the citizens from federal
laws that trample not on states' rights, but rather on
individuals' rights. The converse § 1983 device I discuss at
length in the second half of this essay provides one useful
example of how states can act offensively to counter federal
abuses.
II. DEFENSiVE FEDERALISM - THE DOCTRINES AS THEY EXIST
TODAY
A. Preemption
Before we turn to proactive steps states can take
against federal overreaching, let us first consider some
doctrines that are supposed to - but do not always - insulate
state governments from federal interference. First let us look
briefly at preemption, a topic Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
takes up in earnest in this issue.' An example of federal
preemption in this area - and perhaps a good illustration of
interpreting the powers of states more narrowly than is
appropriate - can be found in an important Supreme Court
6 See Jack Goldsmith, State Foreign Policies After the Burma Case, FIND
LAW'S WRIT, June 26, 2000, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20000626-goldsmith.html (last visited July
8, 2004).
Id.
6 Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004).
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case from a few years back, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council.! In that case, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute that had directed state agencies not to purchase goods
and services from any companies doing business in Burma, a
nation with a notoriously bad human rights record.
In support of its result, the Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress's own sanctions imposed on Burma through a
federal statute represented Congress's considered choice about
how much, and in what ways, Burma should be induced to
change its evil ways. The federal government, the Court
pointed out, had acted affirmatively in this area by imposing
particular sanctions. And, the Court believed, commercial
activity by Massachusetts might have interfered with the
commercial system of incentives Congress sought to establish."
I think the Court may well have decided Crosby
wrongly. It ought to be clear that the people of a state, acting
collectively through their state legislature, can speak their
consciences, even as to matters of foreign affairs. One can
plausibly argue that declining to spend money is simply one
form of collective local expression. But even assuming that
Congress does have the power to regulate the choices that a
state makes when it acts - as Massachusetts did there - in its
capacity as a conscientious consumer (as opposed to its capacity
as a sovereign regulator of private consumers), I think the
evidence is fairly thin that the Massachusetts policy frustrated
congressional will.
After all, the federal law implemented by President
Clinton in 1997 was itself anti-Burma - sending a message
that America wanted the human rights violations to end."
Because the Massachusetts policy reinforced rather than
undermined this overall American goal, I do not see the clear
conflict that the Court did. In the preemption realm states
typically have the power to go further than federal law, but in
the same direction; for instance, their antidiscrimination laws
can be more protective than federal ones.'" Had Massachusetts
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
o Id. at 373-87.
See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1997, 104 Pub. L. No. 208, § 570, 1.0 Stat. 3009-121, 3009-166 to
3009-167 (enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, 104 Pub.
L. No. 208, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009).
12 California's Fair Employment and Housing Act in some respects goes
farther than does the federal Title VII or Title VIII, dealing, respectively, with
employment and housing. Compare Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GovT.
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in its purchasing policies favored companies that did business
in Burma, a finding of conflict would have been more plausible.
But since Congress did not provide any clear statement in its
law that the judiciary should infer preemption, I think respect
for federalism should have counseled the Court to come out the
other way.
Additionally, it bears noting that the Massachusetts law
existed when Congress acted (and indeed might have helped
put the issue on Congress's agenda)." But Congress did not say
anything negative about the Massachusetts law when it
enacted the federal measures; no member of Congress voiced
opposition to what Massachusetts had done. Moreover, the
federal policy in effect when Massachusetts acted - a policy
that had been formed during the 1980s when cities like
Berkeley wanted to divest of holdings in companies operating
in South Africa - clearly allowed states and cities to vote with
their dollars. Indeed, President Clinton and Secretary of State
Albright had publicly lauded such local policies in the years
before the Court decided Crosby. It was against this backdrop
that the U.S. Solicitor General's office under Seth Waxman
seemed to change the rules without clear guidance from
Congress and against the settled expectations of the states.
Given these circumstances, the Court's invalidation of the
Massachusetts law seems somewhat dubious.
Some of the same criticisms apply to the Court's
decision to strike down, by a five-to-four vote, a California law
that regulated insurance companies doing business within the
state in an attempt to force them to disclose information about
the industry's treatment of Holocaust victims over fifty years
ago. 4 The Court held that California's attempt conflicted with
the policy the President had been pursuing, which was less
coercive. Reading presidential actions broadly, the Court
reasoned that because the Constitution gives to the federal
government, and in particular the President, the power (which
CODE §§ 12900-12940 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004), with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"), and Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619, 3631 ("Title VIII").
' See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367.
14 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Garamendi case
may be less susceptible to my criticism here than Crosby because in Garamendi,
California was not deciding how to spend its own money, but rather deciding how to
regulate private insurance companies. Constitutional preemption doctrine has always
given states more leeway when they are deciding how their monies should be spent, as,
for example, in the so-called "market participant exception" to dormant Commerce
Clause principles.
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he had exercised) to negotiate with foreign countries and
foreign companies, California's law could not stand.5
Regardless of whether these two preemption decisions
were right, they do not resolve the issue of the states and
localities expressing their views on Iraq and the war on
terrorism. That is because in these rulings the Court stopped
short of holding that state regulation of foreign affairs is
invalid even in the absence of some affirmative preemptive
action by Congress or the President. This is not to say, of
course, that the Constitution itself would never impose limits
on state and local attempts to affect international affairs. For
example, suppose New Jersey enacted a statute saying that
"any company that makes arms that the U.S. government may
use in any upcoming war cannot incorporate or sell to any
customers in our state." Such a law would clearly burden
interstate and international commerce, not to mention
Congress's ability to raise and support troops, and would thus
be preempted by the Constitution itself. The Constitution gives
Congress the authority to regulate such commerce and the
military,"6 and in doing so, displaces much state legislation on
the topic.
B. Anti-Commandeering
What about those local resolutions recently passed, like
San Francisco's, that direct local agencies not to assist the
federal government? Do states and localities have latitude to
opt out of cooperation with federal agencies? I think they do -
at least to some extent.
As Professor Ann Althouse discusses in much more
detail,17 the Supreme Court, in a series of cases from the mid-
1990s, has made clear that state and local governments cannot
be required to implement a federal law or program on behalf of
the national government if they do not want to. For example,
the Court ruled that Congress could not simply direct local
sheriffs to conduct the pre-purchase background checks called
for in the Brady Act gun control law.8
'5 Id. at 413-28.
18 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17 Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1231 (2004).
1 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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If Congress wants such background checks performed,
the Court opined, it can certainly employ federal personnel to
conduct them, or it can induce states to cooperate by
threatening to preempt states from the field or providing them
generous federal funding conditioned upon their help. But the
federal government cannot simply tell unwilling state
personnel to enforce federal law. The idea that the federal
government cannot "commandeer" or "conscript" states to do
federal bidding, the Court said, is central to the structure of
our system of federalism.19
How that plays out in the context of laws like the U.S.A.
PATRIOT Act and related executive decisions could get
interesting. I think the federal government cannot require
(although it can effectively bribe) state and local authorities to
help surveil persons suspected of violating federal immigration
and other laws. But other questions remain: Can Congress
require a locality to provide to the federal government
information already in the locality's control that concerns
people within its jurisdiction? Can it require local agencies to
compile and gather information that might not yet exist? These
may be another matter.
C. The Bigger Federalism Picture
Much of the ambiguity described in the preceding
section stems from a very basic but unresolved question: What
is the vision of federalism that leads us to prevent the federal
government from commandeering the states really all about?
Why, exactly, is commandeering bad? Justices O'Connor and
Scalia - the authors of the major opinions in the area - have
talked about "accountability" problems that arise when the
federal government coerces the states.' Suppose, for instance,
that federal legislation forces states to implement a federal
policy of tracking down and interrogating aliens from Middle
Eastern countries. Suppose further that the public does not like
such policies. The accountability concern arises because the
populace may blame the state implementers, rather than the
federal policy makers who, after all, are really the ones who
should take the heat.
'9 Id. at 919-22.
20 See Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
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I have never entirely agreed with this reasoning. In the
end, I think American federalism - with its marbled layers of
government, from fire districts to water boards, to cities, to
counties, to states, to federal agencies - is not really designed
to make it easy for people to figure who is to blame for bad
policy decisions. So being a stickler on the accountability issue
in this one instance, when accountability is largely ignored in
the constitutional framework, seems to me somewhat odd.
For example, the Supreme Court allows Congress easily
to condition federal funds on state assistance in the
enforcement of federal programs."1 When states administer
such federal programs, are people really aware that the only
reason states are doing what they are doing may be the desire
or need for federal funding for other projects? I doubt it. If we
really wanted to facilitate clear accountability to voters, we
probably would not have as many overlapping levels of
government as we do. Indeed, we might not have a federal
system, in which federal and state activities and jurisdictions
inevitably coincide, in the first place.
Nevertheless, I think federal commandeering - and
overly broad preemption, for that matter - may be bad for
other reasons, ones that have little to do with accountability.
For instance, in the worst case, federal commandeering of state
legislatures may allow the federal government to highjack
state governmental agendas. If the state lawmaking bodies
have to spend all their time administering federal programs
(on the theory that if Congress can commandeer a little,
presumably it could commandeer a lot), theoretically states
may never have the time or opportunity to define their own
messages and legislative identities. That is a problem because
the value of federalism lies, to my mind, largely in making sure
that there are multiple legislative philosophies and identities
out there to help the American people figure out what is best.'
In this sense, then, our federal system sets up a healthy
competition - between one state and another, and between
states and the federal government - to win over American
hearts and minds on what is the best way to administer
democratic self-governance. It hardly seems like a fair match if
one participant in a competition (the federal government) can
2 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Congress to
deny funding to states that had a minimum drinking age below twenty-one).
22 See generally Todd Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection:
Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003).
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consume all the resources of its competitors (the states). The
vision of federalism I suggest values states not just for the
particular policies they may adopt, but also more generally for
the alternative vision of good government that they may define
and advance. In a real sense, a state government - through its
legislative decisions and agenda - expresses a philosophical
message that is different from the messages that other states
and the federal government may express."
Fine and good, some may say - but not when it comes to
foreign affairs, which is precisely the arena where we cannot
tolerate multiple messages. In that arena, the argument would
run, we need to "speak in one voice." I do not think that is true.
As others have pointed out,
[tiaken literally, [the one voice argument] offends the very basis of
our system of government. Americans emphatically do not speak
with one voice. Individual Americans are free to [speak out on
foreign affairs]. States, too, must be free to speak out. This vital
point was established early in American history, when the Virginia
and Kentucky legislatures famously spoke out [in words written by
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively] in 1798 against
federal policies penalizing France.24
The Alien and Sedition Acts of the late eighteenth
century to which the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were
responses are prime examples in which state and local
government served as the point of organization for those
critical of federal policies. But these are far from the only
instances. Before the Civil War, abolitionist forces used local
governmental bodies to voice their criticisms of southern states,
as well as of federal laws that helped support the institution of
slavery.
In some ways, state and local governments are natural
places for dissidents to organize and speak. Individual
protestors, acting alone, often face societal pressure and
ostracism. For precisely this reason, the Constitution goes out
of its way to create and protect institutions where individuals
who may not be able to act by themselves can come together
with others to associate, organize and have their voices be
heard. These "mediating" institutions - so called because they
stand between the federal government and the People - include
See id.
24 See Akhil Reed Amar, A State's Right, A Government's Wrong, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 2000, at B1.
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juries, churches, the militia, civic associations, and perhaps
most importantly, state and local governments.25
I thus believe states can speak out, refuse to cooperate,
and regulate private people unless preempted by a valid and
clear federal law. But what about the local fears that the
federal government will, in executing its policies, violate the
constitutional rights of the citizens of the several states?
Besides declining to participate in such injustice and railing
and lobbying against it, is there anything states can do? I think
there is. In particular, states can affirmatively and offensively
develop legal vehicles to redress and deter such transgressions.
I shall take up that idea next.
III. FROM HERE, WHERE? CONVERSE § 1983 SUITS
The specific legal vehicle that I use is one my older
brother Akhil first floated fifteen years ago - the notion of
"converse § 1983" laws. 6 I was a law student at Yale when my
brother first ran the idea by me in a draft of an article. I
remember vividly spending countless hours discussing with
him the possibilities the notion raised. I was excited then and
fifteen years later the concept intrigues me even more.
The term "converse-1983" describes a proposed type of
state law designed to provide a remedy or cause of action for
violations of federal constitutional rights committed by federal
officials:
Whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal law remedy/cause of
action for federal constitutional violations perpetrated by state
officials, a converse-1983 law would provide a state law
remedy/cause of action for federal constitutional violations
perpetrated by federal officials. Such a converse-1983 law would both
invoke and invert the logic and language of § 1983, and might read
something like this:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of the United States, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of this state or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution, shall be
See generally Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV.
639(2002).
See Akhil Reed Anar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1512-19 (1987).
[Vol. 69:41378
CONVERSE § 1983 SUITS
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.27
Practically speaking, a new state converse-1983 norm
could emerge in any of three ways. First, it could become part
of the state constitution via initiative, referendum, convention
or special legislative action. Second, a state legislature by a
simple majority could enact converse-1983 language as an
ordinary state statute. Third, state judges have power to
fashion legal norms - such as converse-1983 - as part of the
common law process. Such common law norms, like the norm
against trespass developed by state courts and invoked in the
nineteenth century against federal agents who violated privacy
rights,' can be, and for over two hundred years have been,
invoked against federal officials. In essence, the converse-1983
idea builds upon the tradition of state courts policing Fourth
Amendment privacy violations by federal officials using state
tort law until the 1970s,' and extends that tradition to cover
federal violations of all federal constitutional rights, not just
those under the Fourth Amendment.
Valid congressional removal statutes might allow many
federal officials, if they so choose, to remove damage actions
from state court to a lower federal court. Thus, as a practical
matter, a very high percentage of converse-1983 causes of
action may end up being tried in federal district courts.30 But
whether pursued in state or federal court, a converse-1983
action, unlike a Bivens3" claim created by the federal courts,
cannot be abolished by the federal courts if their attitude about
inferring causes of action changes. Moreover, and more
important, a converse-1983 cause of action need not be saddled
with the "qualified immunity" doctrines that courts have read
into § 1983 and the Bivens creation.2 And as I will explain
below, Congress has no power to require courts to afford
qualified immunity if states have decided not to provide it.
" Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional
Rights: Some Questions and Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159,
160 (1993) (emphasis in original).
See id at 161-63; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:
"Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994).
See Amar, supra note 27, at 161-62.
Id. at 165.
" See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
32 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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The time has never been as ripe as it is today for one or
more states to enact such a converse-1983 device. First, as
already noted, states and localities are concerned about federal
lawlessness as never before in recent memory. These changes
in the political environment make experimentation very timely
and potentially politically feasible. Second, the Supreme Court
over the past decade and a half has confirmed (or established,
depending upon how one views things) the essential soundness
of the intellectual foundations upon which the converse-1983
idea rests. Third, academics are beginning to see the light as
well - but they (apparently) still need a bit more guidance. The
following subsections address the latter two points.
A. Friendly Legal Developments
1. The Importance of the Theory of Vertical
Competition
As important as changes in the political environment
described above are, changes in the legal environment -
particularly the evolution of the Supreme Court's attitudes -
may be even more helpful. In short, the doctrinal habitat
created by the high Court seems as hospitable today as it has
in generations to the development and survival of the converse-
1983 animal.
To begin with, let us look at the larger landscape that
has emerged over the past ten to fifteen years. The point to be
made here is not simply that the Court today takes seriously
the concept of federalism and the idea that state institutions
and state law deserve to be treated with respect - although
surely it does that. Instead, the key notion is that the
particular results the Court has reached in the "new
federalism" arena are completely compatible with, indeed
perhaps best explained by, the theory of vertical competition I
adverted to earlier - Madison's notion that a "double security
arises to the rights of the people . . . [when] different
governments will control each other, at the same time that
each is controlled by itself."33 And it is this theory of vertical
competition that gives rise to the converse-1983 vision.
Consider, in this regard, the two most important recent
cases construing Congress's powers under the Commerce
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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Clause: United States v. Lopez' and United States v. Morrison."
In each case, the Court invalidated a congressional enactment
- in Lopez the Gun Free Schools Zone Act and in Morrison the
Violence Against Women Act - on the key ground that the
activity regulated by the statute was not "economic" or
"commercial" in nature at all.
Critics, both on and off the Court, have questioned this
line between economic activity and non-economic activity as
artificial, if not completely arbitrary. For instance, in his
dissent in Morrison, Justice Breyer asks: "[W]hy should we give
critical constitutional importance to the economic, or
noneconomic, nature of an interstate-commerce-affecting
cause? If chemical emanations through indirect environmental
change cause identical, severe, commercial harm outside a
State, why should it matter whether local factories or home
fireplaces release them?"' Justice Souter echoes this critique:
"What difference should it make whether the causes of effects
are themselves commercial? ... The [majority's] answer is that
it makes a difference to federalism, and the legitimacy of the
Court's new judicially derived federalism is the crux of our
disagreement.""
There is clearly something to this criticism. The Court
never does explain why the economic nature of the activity
matters, only that it does matter. In response to Justice
Souter's implicit charge of activism (by his use of the term
"judicially derived"), the majority could, I suppose, point to the
text of the Constitution. The language of Article I, after all,
does give Congress power to regulate not "activities" or "things"
generically, but rather "commerce" itself.' As a matter of text,
then, "commercial" things that affect commerce may be more
naturally regulable than non-commercial things that affect
commerce to an equal degree.
But I think the Court's real response to Breyer and
Souter is not textual but rather practical - the majority clings
to an arbitrary line because some line is needed. If the dissent's
view were correct, Congress could always point to the
Commerce Clause as a basis for its actions, and the notion of
limited, enumerated, federal powers would be gutted entirely.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
36 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
31 Id. at 643 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST., art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
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That raises the crucial, if underexplored, questions:
Why do we need a line? And what would be so bad about
gutting the notion of limited, enumerated, federal powers?
Among the possible answers, I think the most attractive and
the most plausible is the one that focuses on vertical
competition, and the resulting requirement that states have
available to them some space in which to operate. If there were
no line circumscribing federal power, then the federal
government could preempt everything a state may want to do
to create its own competitive identity. There would be, in other
words, no guarantee of any room for states to stake out a
competing vision, an alternative agenda. Competition is
meaningless if one competitor can, theoretically, prevent the
other from ever leaving the locker room to get out onto the
field. This is why, I think, Justice Kennedy, who provides the
crucial fifth vote in Lopez, writes an important, if cryptic,
explanation in his concurring opinion where he observes that
the two sovereigns "hold each other in check by competing for
the affections of the people.""
The other most prominent line of recent federalism
cases is also best understood to be about facilitating vertically
competitive agendas. I am speaking here of the so-called anti-
commandeering cases mentioned earlier. In New York v.
United States,"° and then again in Printz v. United States,"' the
Court held that Congress could not directly commandeer state
legislatures or state executive officials to administer federal
policies and programs. But in reaching these results, the Court
acknowledged that Congress could preempt state action in
these areas and induce states to cooperate by threatening to
preempt all state regulation in the field. When I think and
teach about these cases, the difficult questions have always
come down to the distinction between preemption and
commandeering. If Congress can keep states out of a field, why
can't Congress make them toil in it?
The Court, as noted above, tried to explain the anti-
commandeering rule in accountability terms. But wouldn't field
preemption (or bribing the states through the spending power,
for that matter) create even more accountability problems? If
states are not dealing with the nuclear waste problem (at issue
in New York) because Congress has prevented them from
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
41 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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entering the area, or because Congress has conditioned needed
federal funds on a promise to stay out, and if people are
disappointed by the lack of regulation, how many voters would
know to blame Congress and not the locals? To be blunt,
accountability is, I think, a very weak rationale for justifying
the New York v. United States rule.
But vertical competition is a fair explanation. If the
federal government can commandeer a little, then it can
commandeer a lot. And if the state lawmaking bodies have to
spend all their resources administering federal programs, they
never have the time or opportunity to define their own message
and legislative identity. Unlike preemption, which we know -
after Lopez and Morrison - has theoretical limits,
commandeering, if permitted, is a federal power that has no
logical limits or stopping points. And again, if one competitor
can prevent the other from ever beginning its warm-ups, let
alone its routine, there is not much real competition.
2. More Specific Things the Justices Have Said Bearing
on Converse-1983 Actions
Let us move beyond the general backdrop of the recent
cases to more specific things the Justices have said and done.
What one sees here is a renewed receptivity to a crucial
premise of the converse-1983 device: the notion that state laws
regulating federal activities are not preempted when the federal
activities themselves are beyond the bounds of the Constitution.
This is the central doctrinal point my brother made when
discussing the most obvious criticism of the converse-1983
device - that it would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause as
understood in the seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland.4"
In McCulloch, Maryland believed that the Second
Federal Bank was unconstitutional; that Congress had no
enumerated power to create such a bank; and that the bank's
federal charter was thus unlawful. Maryland therefore
attempted to impose upon the bank a tax, and when the bank
officials refused to pay, Maryland brought suit in its own state
courts against a bank official, asking for a fine against him for
his failure to comply with the Maryland law. On appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed. As Akhil observed,
41 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also Amar, supra note 26, at 1513-14.
20041 1383
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
[Tihe Supreme Court nowhere denied the legitimacy of the
jurisdiction exercised by the state court below in an action for
damages, of sorts, against a federal official alleged to be part of an
unconstitutional federal operation. Note also how the Supreme Court
structured its analysis in McCulloch. The first question, said the
Court, was whether the bank was in fact constitutional. Only after
assuring itself that the bank was indeed consistent with the federal
Constitution - "necessary and proper" - did the Court address what
it labeled as the second question in the case: whether the state of
Maryland could nonetheless impose its tax. The structure of the
Court's analysis and several passages in the opinion plainly imply
that if the bank had indeed been unconstitutional, perhaps state law
could impose liability on the bank official, Mr. McCulloch. If
anything, all this suggests that when federal officials are acting in
violation of the federal Constitution, state law-created liability may
well be appropriate at times.
Of course, if a state converse-1983 law were to provide for liability
far in excess of making a plaintiff whole, and far in excess of the
quantum of damages for other state causes of action, this punitive
converse-1983 law might offend the spirit of McCulloch. Imagine, for
example, a converse-1983 law that provided for one million dollars of
presumed damages for any Fourth Amendment violation by federal
officials, however technical the violation and however minimal the
actual harm to Fourth Amendment values of property, personhood,
and privacy. This presumed damage rule could well be seen as a tax
masquerading as a remedy, and thus violative of McCulloch's spirit.'
This centrality of the first part of McCulloch - that the
bank is constitutional - in reaching the result in the second
part - that the tax is unconstitutional - has itself been realized
and commented upon by members of the Court over the last
decade. Most directly, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,"
Justice Thomas, in arguing in favor of a state's ability to
regulate federal officials - in that case the power of a state to
prescribe qualifications for persons from the state to be elected
to Congress - observed that the "structure" of McCulloch's
analysis was set up such that
[tihe question before the Court was whether the State of Maryland
could tax the Bank of the United States, which Congress had created
in an effort to accomplish objects entrusted to it by the Constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion began by upholding the federal
statute incorporating the bank. It then held that the Constitution
affirmatively prohibited Maryland's tax on the bank created by this
statute. The Court relied principally on concepts deemed inherent in
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, which declares that "this
43 Amar, supra note 27, at 168.
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof... shall be supreme Law of the Land.... .,"
As Justice Thomas went on to explain, it was the
McCulloch Court's view that "when a power has been
'delegated to the United States by the Constitution,' . . . the
Supremacy Clause forbids a State to 'retard, impede, burden,
or in any manner control, the operations of constitutional laws
enacted by Congress.'' Thus, according to Justice Thomas,
Maryland's lack of power turned on the existence of federal
power to enact the policy in question.
This seemingly simple point has not been deeply enough
appreciated, even though it underlies all of federal preemption
doctrine, not just the cases dealing with so-called
intergovernmental immunity - that is, cases involving laws by
one governmental entity regulating another. For example,
when we decide whether federal policy preempts a state law
regulating private businesses or private citizens, we ask first
whether the federal policy is constitutional. If not, then there is
no federal policy to do any preempting. Even in the field of
foreign affairs preemption, where the Court wrongly thinks
states have little role to play, the Court first asks in each case
whether the allegedly preempting federal decision to regulate
is itself a valid exercise of the federal government's powers.47
Indeed, in Thornton Justice Thomas indicates that his
reading of McCulloch - as a species of preemption doctrine
more generally - has been embraced by the Court for over 175
years. For instance, he describes the Osborn" case with the
following parenthetical reference to McCulloch: "reaffirming
McCulloch's conclusion that by operation of the Supremacy
Clause, the federal statute incorporating the bank impliedly
pre-empted state laws attempting to tax the bank's
operations."' 9
And it makes perfect sense to think of McCulloch as just
one example of preemption more broadly. Most of the time
41 Id. at 853-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 854 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X, and
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436).
41 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-14 (2003). Note
that under the theory of inherent federal powers in some areas, the federal power need
only be valid, not necessarily enumerated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
4 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 783, 859-68
(1824).
41 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 854 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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federal preemption is asserted, the question presented is
whether state laws are regulating private persons in a way
different than that preferred by Congress. But whether states
regulate private persons in a way that the federal government
does not like, or whether the states regulate the federal
regulators themselves in a way that bothers the federal
government, federal objectives are equally frustrated in both
settings. Federal instrumentalities - be they statutes, banks,
legislators, or executive officers - exist under our democratic
theory only to pursue federal policies on behalf of the national
populace; they are means to various ends, not ends in
themselves. If we do not preempt state regulation of private
parties that is inconsistent with congressional desires except
when those congressional desires are themselves
constitutionally permissible - and we do not - then we should
not preempt state regulation of federal entities when those
entities are engaged in constitutionally impermissible
activities. Since it is the "operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress" ° (the phrase McCulloch uses) that is the
thing to be protected, the rules should be the same whether the
state frustrates that "operation" by interfering with the
"operators" (the federal agents), or by interfering with those on
whom the federal law purports to "operate" (the citizens).
For example, in Lopez, if, prior to the Supreme Court's
ruling, a state had told citizens that they were obliged to
possess guns near schools - indeed, if a state had written its
laws to provide explicitly that "those persons who are subject to
the federal Gun Free School Zone Act's prohibitions, as they
are written in the United States Code, are required to possess
guns near schools" - we would not find the state law
preempted. Because the federal policy that the state legislation
frustrated would itself have been unconstitutional, there would
be no preemption, as there would be no valid preempting
federal action. States remain free to frustrate the federal
government's objectives - by regulating the federal government
or by targeting the citizens the federal government is trying to
regulate - when the federal objectives themselves are not
within federal power.
One may assert a couple of possible responses against
the foregoing analysis. First is the observation that Justice
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (emphasis
added).
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Thomas' analysis in Thornton commanded the support of only
four dissenting Justices, suggesting that the majority must
have a different conception in mind. Second is the related idea
that there is a difference between regulating the regulator and
regulating the regulated, and the Court's opinions in New York
and Printz demonstrate this. I shall address each of these
suggestions in turn.
3. Justice Stevens' Opinion in Thornton
As for the majority analysis in Thornton, it is true that
Justice Stevens does purport to rest the Court's holding that
Arkansas could not impose qualifications on members of
Congress on two "independent" ideas:" first, that states lack
that power in the first place because no power over federal
institutions is "reserved" within the meaning of the Tenth
Amendment; and second, the Constitution affirmatively divests
states of any power over the newly-created congressional
offices.
There are a number of observations that need be made
about this, only some of which - remarkably enough - were
made in the opinions in the case itself or commentary since. To
begin, even Justice Stevens concedes that his first holding is
not necessary to the case. In Justice Stevens's mind, the second
"divesting" theory is "independent" enough to sustain on its
own the result in the case.
In fact, this second (and quite correct, I might add)"2
"divesting" theory must do all the work, because the first
reason Stevens advances is quite weak. Justice Stevens tries to
argue that states cannot regulate congresspersons because
power to regulate them is not "reserved" to states within the
meaning of the Tenth Amendment' for the simple reason that
the federal institutions did not predate the Constitution and
you cannot "reserve" what you never had. As Stevens, quoting
5' Thornton, 514 U.S. at 800.
12 I think it quite clear that the people of each State, were affirmatively
deprived of any control over federal legislators. See generally Vikram David Amar, The
People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State
Legislatures in the Article V Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1049-
53, 1090-91 (2000).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Joseph Story, writes: "No state can say that it has reserved,
what it never possessed."'
This (to my mind somewhat facile) argument clearly
fails. For starters, as Justice Thomas points out, the word
"reserved" does not necessarily mean "preexisting."5 Thomas's
textual argument would have been even stronger had he
contrasted the word "reserved" in the Tenth Amendment with
the word "preserved" in the Seventh Amendment.' "Preserved"
does tend to focus on that which existed before, much more so
than "reserved."
Moreover, and more important as a textual matter,
there is no text in the Constitution that says: "States have only
those powers that were 'reserved' within the meaning of the
Tenth Amendment and that were not taken away by the
Constitution." Justice Stevens' first argument in Thornton,
which he says is "independent" of the second divesting theory,
reads such a clause into the Constitution, even though there is
no reason to, and even though it would not make sense under
founding theory. Thus, whether the power to regulate federal
entities is "reserved" does not answer the only question that
matters, namely, whether such a power exists."
Imagine, for example that at the time of the founding,
most state constitutions gave state governments no power over,
say, the raising of horses. Indeed, assume that most state
constitutions explicitly said: "The state shall have no power
over raising horses." Assume that the federal Constitution
contains no provision to regulate horse raising that could be
read to displace any state power that might exist. Can't the
people of each state, after 1787, give their governments the
power to regulate horse raising? No one would say that state
laws concerning horse raising today violate the federal
Constitution simply because state power over horses did not
exist in 1787 and thus was not "reserved." Instead, the only
federal question we would ask (and the Supreme Court gets to
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 802 (quoting J. STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858)).
" Thornton, 514 U.S. at 851 (Thomas, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
To say that Stevens is wrong in styling his first argument as "independent"
is not to say that the question of whether states had "reserved" powers to regulate
federal entities is irrelevant to the case. If such powers were assumed to exist in 1787,
then such assumptions may bear on the second (and to my mind, key) question -
whether any such powers are foreclosed by the Constitution's words, structure, and
history.
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ask only federal questions) is: Is there anything in the text or
structure of the federal Constitution that prevents states from
regulating horses? This more precise question is akin to the
second "divesting" question Stevens asks in Thornton.
Even the language from John Marshall that Justice
Stevens quotes in Thornton illustrates this. Marshall points
out that the exercise of power by state government, where it
has not been affirmatively foreclosed by the federal
constitution, is not a federal concern, but rather a matter
between the state government and the people of that state -
the source of all legitimate power in that state, save what has
been given up to the federal government or the federal
populace: "These [state] powers proceed, not from the people of
America, but from the people of the several States; and remain,
after the adoption of the constitution, what they were before,
except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument."'
But what "they were before" is subject to expansion by the
people of the states themselves.
Indeed, even Justice Stevens must realize this. He does
not want to call into question the application of all state law to
any federal institution, even though the federal institution by
definition did not predate 1787. For instance, states have
power to require federal officials to obey some local traffic
rules, 9 and I doubt Justice Stevens would want to call that into
question. And if Justice Stevens' response were to invoke the
principle of generality - if he were to argue that states had
power in 1787 to regulate traffic more generally and that is
what gives them the power to regulate, say, federal postal
vehicles - then I would say, with regard to converse-1983s,
states have all along had the power to regulate "illegality" more
generally.
In a similar vein, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena' the
Supreme Court - in rejecting the notion that Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress a remedial power
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819)).
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
[An employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from
state law while acting in the course of his employment.... [Wlhen the United
States has not spoken, the subjection to local law would extend to general
rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the employment
- as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at
the corners of streets.
Id. at 56.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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that states lack altogether - effectively realized that states
have authority to remedy Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations on terms similar to those enjoyed by the
federal government, even though the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments post-date the "reserved powers.""
Regardless of whether states enjoy the power to remedy
constitutional violations because it was delegated to them in
the Supremacy Clause itself - which tells states as well as the
federal government to "support" the Constitution - or simply
because states are free to exercise this power so long as the
people of a state want to, that such power did or did not exist
before 1787 seems to be of no moment.
If there is any lingering question whether Justice
Stevens's temporal argument applies to the realm of
unconstitutional federal conduct, let me point out that in
Thornton the Court did not address a situation where
Arkansas was regulating congresspersons to try to keep them
in compliance with the Constitution. No matter how laudable
Arkansas' goals may have been, not even Arkansas argued that
term limits were required under the federal Constitution.
Justice Stevens's observations, then, do not have much force at
all in a context, like converse-1983s, where states regulate not
federal policy, but federal unconstitutionality. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Thornton limits Justice Stevens's
majority opinion, and Justice Kennedy explicitly and carefully
addresses Justice Stevens's temporal argument and the
meaning of McCulloch, in the following terms: "The states have
no power, reserved or otherwise, over the exercise of federal
authority within its proper sphere."' In a converse-1983 setting,
"1 There may be other good reasons to cut the federal government more
latitude to use race-conscious laws, but the mere existence of Section 5 is not
necessarily one of them.
See U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 3. As David Currie has pointed out, Congress
itself relied on the Supremacy Clause to enact oath laws and fugitive slave laws. See,
e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the
Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 171
(1995). If the Supremacy Clause is itself a delegation of authority to the federal
government to make appropriate laws to enforce the Constitution, its language would
indicate that states - who are equally bound to support the Constitution - would have
the same power. If this is true, though, one might ask, why were Section Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment needed?
Perhaps to remove all doubt on the question. See generally Akhil Reed Amar,
Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1998).
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Indeed, Kennedy argues in his next breath that Arkansas must be kept from
interfering with valid federal policies for the same reason that the federal government
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by definition, federal authority has exceeded its proper scope.
Also, Joseph Story, on whose words Justice Stevens builds his
argument, says explicitly in a part of his Commentaries not
mentioned by Justice Stevens that the rightly-decided
McCulloch ruling (and a similar ruling that held invalid state
efforts to interfere with federal bonds) "turn upon the point
that no state can have the authority to tax an instrument of the
United States, or thereby to diminish the means of the United
States, used in the exercise of powers confided to it.""
4. Intergovernmental Respect and Immunity
It seems clear, then, that state remedies against federal
lawlessness are not prohibited merely on the ground that
states as a general matter lack such remedial power. If there is
a problem with such a remedy, it must be because the
Constitution's structure affirmatively forbids the states from
exercising remedial power against federal agents. As indicated
above, McCulloch does not support that position. But
McCulloch is not, of course, the Court's last word on the limits
that the Constitution places on the ability of one level of
government to directly regulate another. There are many
decisions of the last decade or so that address this issue.
In particular, some may read New York and Printz to
say that one participant in this vertical competition cannot
target and discriminate against the other. I do not understand
these cases to stand for such a broad principle at all. Instead,
as I noted earlier, they are cases about accountability or more
plausibly the dangers of one government highjacking the
agenda of the other. Needless to say, because converse-1983
actions would target only behavior unlawful under a federal
standard, there are no accountability or agenda-highjacking
concerns in a converse-1983 setting.'
Indeed, even as nothing in Printz's general rule and its
justification call into question converse-1983, an exception to
must be kept within its bounds, making clear his overarching concern with policing the
Constitution's substantive limits.
64 J. STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
503 (1833) (emphasis added).
Moreover, a converse-1983 law that a state enacted that applied to state
officers as well as federal officers would not "discriminate" against the federal
government in any event. Such laws may, however, be less likely to pass than ones that
target federal misdeeds, and I, like my brother, do not think such a non-discrimination
requirement exists in this setting.
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the Printz rule supports the converse-1983 idea. In Printz
itself, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court noted that an early
Congress had conscripted state executive officials in one
particular setting - to comply with the Constitution's
extradition requirements. Justice Scalia explained away this
episode as not inconsistent with the rest of his opinion on the
ground that this early federal statute was "in direct
implementation . . . of the Extradition Clause of the
Constitution itself."" Thus, unlike the Brady Act, the
Extradition Act was a permissible kind commandeering
because it was designed to enforce the Constitution itself
rather than simply some statutory goal. Whatever the scope of
the anti-commandeering principle protecting states, then, it
does not apply when the Constitution itself is being enforced.
Converse-1983 statutes, of course, are "a direct implementation
of the entire Constitution itself."
This distinction between federal statutory enforcement
and federal constitutional enforcement also explains why,
under the Court's jurisprudence concerning Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government can regulate
the states directly and indeed impose upon them monetary
liability that may interfere with their ability to structure their
own identities and agendas. In cases like the recently decided
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,7 Congress is
allowed, under the new federalism, to discriminate against
states and even subject them to unique monetary liability,
when states have been violating federal constitutional rights,'
even though Congress cannot impose such liability on states
merely for violating ordinary federal statutes.'
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909 (1997).
" Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
See id. Indeed, Congress can even act prophylactically. Perhaps under a
converse-1983, a state could try to be prophylactic too - targeting not just
unconstitutional federal conduct but rather conduct that includes, yet extends beyond,
unconstitutional actions by federal officials. Query whether states should enjoy the
same license to be prophylactic that Congress enjoys, even assuming the state remedy
in question were "congruent and proportional" to federal violations.
' Cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (distinguishing
between constitutional violations by states and violations of federal laws that do not
enforce the Constitution but rather simply are consistent with Congress' enumerated
powers).
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B. Academic Developments
In addition to these political and doctrinal
developments, constitutional scholars seem more interested in
and somewhat more receptive to the idea of a converse-1983
device than they were a decade ago. To begin with, the "vertical
competition" premise behind the idea is at least part of the
mainstream federalism dialogue now in a way that it was not
ten years back." Second, the particular idea of a converse-1983
device is at least being acknowledged much more in the
literature. During the first six years after Akhil first floated
the idea, not a single citation to the device was made in any
law review article picked up by Westlaw or Lexis. In last six
years, the idea has at least been cited, if not discussed, over
thirty times.
And some people are devoting a lot of thought to the
idea, and internalizing its basics - sort of. The most important,
prominent, and recent academic treatment of the converse-
1983 device comes in a recent essay by former Solicitor General
Seth Waxman and Trevor Morrison (who worked for Solicitor
General Waxman and who now teaches law) on federal
immunities from state law recently published in the Yale Law
Journal.1
First, the good news: Solicitor General Waxman and
Professor Morrison say they are "inclined to agree that at least
some kinds of converse-1983 laws are constitutional" and not
barred entirely by federal Supremacy principles because Akhil
"convincingly points out that converse-1983 statutes in fact
would enforce the Supremacy Clause by ensuring that federal
action complies with the Constitution."" (Supremacy of the
federal Constitution over inconsistent federal governmental
action is, after all, the basis of Marbury.) They also apparently
find quite important the fact - documented by my brother -
that in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court applied and
thus implicitly upheld state law causes of action brought
against federal officials to redress conduct that violated the
federal Constitution.73
70 See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 22.
71 Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal
Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003).
72 Id. at 2246-47.
7I id.
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Now the bad news: I do not think Solicitor General
Waxman and Professor Morrison completely understand the
converse-1983 theory. I say this because they part company
with the converse-1983 device at a most crucial point - whether
such a device can strip federal officials of the qualified
immunity they now enjoy under Bivens actions.74 I think it is
helpful to explain exactly how and why they - to my mind - get
it wrong, because I fear that their instincts are all too common.
At the outset, they make what I view as a bit of a false
start. They begin with the question of whether a remedy that
contains qualified immunity itself violates the Constitution,
and they conclude (quite sensibly) that it cannot, else Bivens
and § 1983 would themselves be unconstitutional. But in a
converse-1983 case, the question is not whether a federal court
or Congress must abolish immunity in remedies that it creates,
but rather whether federal law necessarily forecloses a state's
decision to abolish immunity in a remedy that the state
creates. That a federal court or Congress could rationally
choose to include immunities in remedies that it fashions does
not mean that the federal government can override a state's
decision not to include immunities in its own causes of action. 5
So, the only question is whether the Constitution or a
congressional statute can operate to preempt a state's decision
in this regard. General Waxman and Professor Morrison
ultimately see this as the $64,000 question, but their detour
concerning whether the Constitution requires all remedies to
remove immunity takes us away from the central inquiry.
7, Id. at 2248.
Congress didn't have to provide a § 1983 remedy at all, so Congress can be
underinclusive if it wants to. And certainly judicial caution could lead a federal court to
move incrementally in the remedies it creates. As Akhil has put the point:
Why might the Supreme Court allow state law to be more generous towards
citizen victims (on either the immunity issue, or possibly on the issue of
quantum of damages) than the Court itself has been under Bivens? Perhaps
because the Court itself has been dubious of the legitimacy of Bivens and has
chosen to tread very carefully and gingerly. Even though Bivens is not a
species of the Swift v. Tyson type of "general" federal common law condemned
in Erie, but is rather a prime example of what Judge Friendly labeled the
.new" federal common law, it was condemned as illegitimate by several
dissenters in Bivens, including Justice Black. But however controversial
federal common law - "new" or old - fashioned by federal judges may be, no
one disputes the common law role of state judges. Thus, Justice Black went
out of his way in his Bivens dissent to concede that he would cheerfully
enforce a cause of action against lawless federal officials if either "Congress []
or the State of New York" had created such a cause of action.
Amar, supra note 27, at 174-75.
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Moreover, their reasoning on the key question of
whether Congress could pass a law reinstating immunity -
they say Congress could - is to my mind underexplanatory and
unpersuasive." They assert that Congress could validly pass a
law reinstating qualified immunity in order to vindicate the
interest in vigorous federal law enforcement. The idea -
commonly invoked in immunity circles - is that if the agents
know they are personally liable for crossing a line, they may
not approach the line at all, to the detriment of vigorous
enforcement. The need for "breathing room" in law
enforcement, they suggest, is a valid federal concern." I have
some problems with that.
First, they never explain why, if (as they suggest) the
existing broad array of federal statutes reflect this interest in
breathing room, the Supreme Court declined in the nineteenth
century to displace state causes of action that lacked immunity.
They acknowledge cases in which state causes of action
unencumbered by immunity doctrines imposed liability on
federal agents for federal constitutional misdeeds. Indeed,
Waxman and Morrison cite to such cases to explain why they
are "inclined to agree" that converse-1983s are not
impermissible per se. And yet they do not explain how those
cases could exist - or where the opposing cases are - if existing
federal interests reflected in existing federal statutes are
preemptive.
Second, and more crucially, they never ask or explain
why such federal interests - and the statutes that implement
them - would be "proper" within the meaning of the Sweeping
Clause." Again, their argument on behalf of Congress would
proceed along the following lines: "We need to violate the
Constitution so that we can enforce the laws that don't violate
the Constitution." But that is another way of arguing that the
" If a state passed a converse-1983 law, and Congress had to explain why it
was preempting part of it, at least there would be political costs to pay.
" General Waxman and Professor Morrison note that:
[The federal government's] interest is not just in keeping the letter of federal
law free from state interference, but also in affording federal officers enough
leeway to implement federal law and policy effectively. The integrity of
federal law depends on its sound execution, which, in turn, depends on the
actions of federal officers. Thus, as we have explained, the policy aim of
qualified immunity - protecting against the "risk that fear of personal ...
liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge
of their duties" - also describes the federal interest at stake in Supremacy
Clause immunity.
Waxman & Morrison, supra note 71, at 2251.
71 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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constitutionally permissible ends justify some unconstitutional
means. That is exactly what Justice Marshall in the first part
of McCulloch said Congress could not do: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [Clonstitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.'"9
The Constitution itself draws lines - identifies
impermissible means - so that the federal government cannot
argue, for instance, we need to deny persons "due process" in
order to better and more efficiently regulate immigration.
There are many things a government might have a sincere and
laudable reason for wanting to do; the Constitution tells us not
only what the federal government can want to do, but also how
the government can go about doing it.
Of course, many constitutional provisions take account
of exigencies of the day. For instance, what constitutes an
"unreasonable" search may depend upon whether there is a
war. And whether the federal government has a valid claim to
operate in an area may also depend upon the foreign affairs
context - the theory of delegated enumerated powers may not
be as applicable in the arena of federal control of foreign
relations as it is in the domestic affairs realm.' But even in the
area of international affairs, federal power is not absolute, and
is limited by particular provisions of the Constitution,
including some that create individual rights 1 enforceable under
a converse-1983 statute. Once we say something is
unconstitutional - and converse-1983s impose liability only if
there is a substantive violation of the Constitution - then the
federal government has no "proper" or valid interest in using
an impermissible means.
My point may also be seen, I think, by imagining an
injunctive action rather than a damage claim against a federal
officer. Damages and injunctive relief are designed to do the
same thing - to restore or maintain the position plaintiff would
be in if there were no illegal action by the defendant" - and the
only reason we cannot get an injunction for everything is there
'9 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis
added).
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321
(1936).
8' See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
8' See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES
AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002).
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is never a court around at the instant you need one.' Imagine
we knew that federal agents were about to violate the Fourth
Amendment, say, by impermissibly taking into account the
race of the searched persons. Suppose further that we were
about to go to a court to seek an injunction against the
impermissible use of race in the minds of the INS agents
deciding whom to search. Now imagine that Congress had
passed a law saying: "Courts can issue no injunctions against
the use of race by INS agents, because even if the use of race is
unconstitutional, when INS agents are worried about whether
they can have race on the mind, they may worry too much and
forget about other relevant and permissible things. In other
words, any injunction, no matter how narrowly drafted, may
induce, because of the fear of a contempt citation, a timidity
that we think would hinder aggressive enforcement of valid
laws."
Could this concern over federal "gun-shyness" be
genuine by Congress? Sure. Is it rational for Congress to think
that agents would more vigorously enforce laws if there were
no injunctions and thus no possibility of contempt? Yes.' Would
a court still issue the injunction? I think so. And the only basis
on which a court could and would disregard the congressional
statute would be that it is not constitutional, because not
constitutionally "proper." Unless the court were to find
Congress's law unconstitutional, it could not prefer the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the congressional statute; unless
constitutionally improper, the federal statute would be entitled
to supremacy under Marbury just as much as the Constitution
would. Indeed, it is the constitutional supremacy ideal that
Solicitor General Waxman and Professor Morrison
acknowledge that makes the converse-1983 device defensible in
the first place. And yet they seem to forget their own premises
when they say that a congressional law designed to facilitate
violations of the constitution - albeit with a good motive - is
supreme and thus can displace state law.
This timing problem drives the mootness and ripeness doctrines. See, e.g.,
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983).
' Such a law would not strip courts of jurisdiction. Cf. Ex Parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Nor would it direct who wins or loses on the merits. Cf. U.S.
v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871). Rather, it would simply regulate remedies the courts
could give. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
" That is why, if converse-1983s came into being, Congress would naturally
indemnify its agents.
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Waxman and Morrison themselves seem to intuit that
their reasoning is a bit shaky, so they say that in situations
where the officer "by any reasonable standard . . . clearly
act[ed] ultra vires," then perhaps congressional immunity
would be unavailable.' Where does that standard come from? It
is literally made up. The Constitution itself tells us what is
"ultra vires" - namely, those things done in violation of the
Constitution. By definition an action is not within lawful power
if unconstitutional, as would be the case for any conduct
targeted by a converse-1983 law. There are no degrees of "ultra
vires" - that concept is digital; either something is "beyond the
powers" (the Latin translation of "ultra vires") or it is not. For
my part, I will stay with the lines the Constitution draws.
IV. CONCLUSION: WILL STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE COURTS,
AND FEDERAL COURTS LISTEN?
Who knows whether state legislatures or courts will
seize the current opportunity. States may understandably fear
federal reprisals in funding and other areas if they were to act
aggressively to rein in federal abuses. Funding to cities will
likely remain a key point of contention in the war on terror. As
for the reaction of the federal judiciary, there remains a
persistent asymmetrical federalism instinct out there. No one,
for instance, targets federal sovereign immunity even though
some Justices argue that state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment makes no sense and runs counter to our
founding ideals. Courage and consistency are not always easy
to come by. But the time is as ripe as ever for states to test the
soul of this new federalism.
' Waxman & Morrison, supra note 71, at 2255.
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